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adjustment loans from the IMF and World Bank-  that the cyclical component of those policy variables
reduces the growth elasticity of poverty reduction.  affects poverty.
Easterly finds no evidence for structural adjustment  Easterly speculates that the poor may be ill placed to
having a direct effect on growth.  take advantage of new opportunities  created by
The poor benefit less from output expansion in  structural adjustment reforms, just as they may suffer less
countries with many adjustment loans than they do in  from the loss of old opportunities in sectors that were
countries with few such loans. By the same token, the  artificially protected  before reform.
poor suffer less from an output contraction  in countries  Poverty's lower sensitivity to growth under adjustment
with many adjustment loans than in countries with few.  lending is bad news when an economy expands and good
Why would this be?  news when it contracts. These results could be
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Abstract:  Structural adjustment, as measured by the number of adjustment loans from
the IMF and World Bank, reduces the growth elasticity of poverty reduction. I find no
evidence for a direct effect of structural adjustment  on growth. The poor benefit less from
output expansion in countries with many adjustment loans than in countries with few
adjustment  loans. By the same token, the poor suffer less from an output contraction in
countries with many adjustment loans than in countries with few adjustment loans. Why
would this be? One hypothesis that adjustment lending is counter-cyclical in ways that
smooth consumption for the poor. There is evidence that some policy variables under
adjustment  lending are counter-cyclical,  but there is no evidence that the cyclical
component of those policy variables affects poverty. I speculate that the poor may be ill-
placed to take advantage of new opportunities created by structural adjustment  reforms,
just as they may suffer less from the loss of old opportunities in sectors that were
artificially protected prior to reforms.
1  Views  expressed  here  are not necessarily  those  of the World  Bank.  I arn  grateful  to Martin  Ravallion  and
Shaohua  Chen  for making  their  poverty  spells  database  available.  I am also  grateful  for  discussions  with
David  Dollar,  Peter  Lanjouw,  and  Martin  Ravallion,  and for  comments  by Anders  Aslund,  Ricardo
Hausmann,  Nora  Lustig,  Aart  Krmay,  Michael  Kremer,  Sergio  Schmukler,  and  John  Williamson  and  by
pardcipants  in the NBER  Pre-Conference  on Management  of Currency  Crises  in Cambridge  MA  July  2000
and  the First  Annual  IMF  Research  Conference  November  2000.  Any  remaining  errors  are the
responsibility  of the author  alone.2
Poverty reduction is in the news for both the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF
web-site says
In September 1999, the objectives  of the IMF's concessional  lending were broadened to include an explicit
focus on poverty reduction in the context of a growth oriented strategy. The IMF will support, along with
the World  Bank, strategies elaborated by the borrowing country in a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP).  2
For its part, the World Bank headquarters has built into its lobby wall the slogan "our
dream is a world free of poverty."  The recent East Asian currency crisis and its
aftershocks  in other countries generated  intense concern about how the poor were faring
under structural adjustment  programs supported by the Bank and the Fund. The poverty
issue is so red-hot that IMF and World Bank staff began to feel that every action inside
these organizations,  from reviewing public expenditure  to vacuuming the office carpet,
should be justified by its effect on poverty reduction.
At the same time, there has been a long standing criticism from the left of Bank
and Fund structural adjustment programs as disproportionately  hurting the poor:
When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank arrive in southern countries, corporate
profits go up, but so do poverty and suffering. Decades of promises that  just a little more "short-term  " pain
will bring long-term gain have exposed the IMF and World Bank as  false prophets whose mission is to
protect those who already control too much wealth and power. 3
A report  published today by the World  Development  Movement (WDM) shows that the International
Monetary Fund's (IMF) new Poverty Reduction Strategies are acting as barriers to policies benefiting the
world's poorest  people.4
Many developing  countries suffered ... sustained increases in prosperity, accompanied by dramatic
increases in inequality and child poverty ... under the auspices of IMF and World Bank adjustment
programmes. 5
In country after country, structural adjustment  programs (SAPs) have reversed the development successes
of the 1960s and 1970s, with ... millions sliding into  poverty every  year. Even the World Bank has had to
accept that SAPs have  failed the poor, with a special burden  falling on women.and children. Yet together
with the IMF it still demands that developing countries  persist with SAPs. 6
2 http://www.imf.org/externalnp/exr/facts/prgf.htmn




This paper examines the effect of IMF and World Bank adjustment lending on
poverty reduction. I briefly examine the effect of IMF and World Bank adjustment
lending on growth and find no effect (suitably instrumenting  for adjustment lending),
which is in line with the previous long and inconclusive  literature. My main result is that
IMF and World Bank adjustment lending lowers the growth elasticity of poverty, that is
the amount of change in poverty rates for a given amount of growth. This means that
economic expansions benefit the poor less under structural adjustment,  but at the same
time economic contractions hurt the poor less. What could be the mechanisms for such a
result?
There could be several possible explanations.  I first speculate that IRF and World
Bank conditionality  may be less austere when lending occurs during an economic
contraction, while conditionality may require more macro adjustment during an
expansion. If macro adjustment disproportionately  hurts the poor -- say because fiscal
adjustment,  for example, is implemented  through increasing regressive taxes like sales
taxes or decreasing progressive spending like transfers -- then we get the result that IMF
and World Bank adjustment lending lowers the growth elasticity of poverty. Adjustment
lending could even include an explicit fiscal insurance mechanism such as an increase in
subsidies that cushions the effect of contractions on the poor, but accompanied by a
reduction in subsidies in times of expansion. We can test this hypothesis explicitly by
evaluating the behavior of fiscal policy and macro policy variables during expansions and
contractions, with or without adjustment lending.
A nearly opposite hypothesis is that IMF and World Bank conditionality may
itself cause an expansion or contraction in aggregate  output -- depending on the4
composition of the structural adjustment package -- but not affect the poor very much.
This view would see the poor as mainly deriving their income from informal sector and
subsistence activities, which are not affected much by fiscal policy changes or
adjustments in macro policies, Structural adjustment  packages usually imply some
previously favored formal sector activities must contract while other formal sector
activities newly favored can expand. The net effect may be overall contraction or
expansion, depending on the initial sizes of the declining and expanding sectors and the
specific policy measures in the structural adjustment  package. However, if the poor are
not tightly linked to either the expanding or the contracting formal sector, then the
amount of poverty change for a given amount of output change may not be very high
under structural adjustment. An expansion or contraction  in the absence of adjustment
lending, on the other hand, may reflect economy-wide factors that lift or sink all boats. I
will not be able to test this hypothesis directly because of lack of comparable data on the
size of the informal sector and its incidence among the poor, but I offer it as a backup
hypothesis in case the first hypothesis fails.
1. Data and concepts for paper
I have data for 1980-98 on all types of IMF lending and on World Bank
adjustment lending. IMF lending includes stand-bys, extended arrangements, structural
adjustment facilities, and enhanced structural adjustment facilities (recently renamed
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities). The latter two kinds of operations are
concessional for low-income countries. World Bank adjustment lending includes
structural adjustment  loans, sectoral structural adjustment loans, and structural
adjustment  credits (the latter is concessional for low-income countries). The data are5
reported in the year that the loans are approved. Hence, my data take the form of number
of new Bank and Fund adjustment loans approved each year. It would be preferable to
have data that record also how long these loans are in effect, but the data are
unfortunately  not available in this format. For any time period I consider in this paper, I
consider the average number of new Bank and Fund adjustment loans per year.
Conditionality associated with these loans is well-known: macroeconomic
conditions like reducing budget deficits, devaluation, and reducing domestic credit
expansion, and structural conditions like freeing controlled prices and interest rates,
reducing trade barriers, and privatizing state enterprises. Although the Fund is associated
more with the former and the Bank with the latter, in practice neither will proceed with
an adjustment loan unless the other is satisfied with progress on "its" area of
responsibility.
For data on poverty, I use an updated version of Ravallion and Chen's (1997)
database on poverty spells. These authors were careful to choose spells and countries
where the definition of poverty was constant and comparable over time and across
countries. The source of the data is household surveys.  They report the proportion of the
population that is poor at the poverty line of $2 per day at the beginning of the spell and
the end of the spell (they also report the poverty rates for a poverty line of $1 per day, but
I choose to use the former because many countries have a 0 initial value at $1 per day).
They also report the Gini coefficients at the beginning and the end, and the mean income
in the household survey at the beginning and the end. They report data on 155 spells for
65 developing countries (the Appendix table gives the countries and numbers of spells
each). The spells are quite short (median length 3 years), and so I interpret them more as6
cyclical fluctuations in mean consumption and poverty rather than as long-run tendencies
in growth and poverty reduction. Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for all the data:
Table  1: Descriptive  Statistics  on  Variables  Used
Change  in  Mean  Initial  Initial  Adjustment
poverty  consumption  Gini  poverty  loans  per
Growth  rate  year
Mean  6.0%  -1.1%  39.5  41.2  0.62
Median  -0.1%  0.0%  39.5  36.3  0.50
Std.  Dev.  31.5%  11.1%  11.1  29.6  0.60
Observations  149  155  155  154  150
II. Results on Adjustment Lending and Poverty Reduction
Following Ravallion 1997,  1 regress the change in poverty rate on growth of mean
income and the interaction of growth of mean income with the Gini coefficient. The idea
of this specification is that if the poor have a low share in existing income (high Gini),
they will likely have a low share in newly created income (low growth elasticity of
poverty reduction). I also include the level of the initial Gini for completeness.  To test the
effect of IMF and World Bank adjustment  lending, I include the variable measuring
number of adjustment  loans per year during the poverty spell and also interact this
variable with growth.
There is the well known selection bias problem with World Bank and IMF
lending. This lending goes to countries that are in trouble, and this trouble could include
initial high poverty rates. We could even imagine that World Bank and IMF programs go
to countries who are more likely to reduce poverty rapidly. With these concerns in mind,
I instrument for World Bank and IMF lending. I follow the practice of the foreign aid
literature in using dummies that measure friends of influential donors, including a
dummy for Central America, one for Egypt, and one for Franc Zone countries. I also7
include continent dummies as instruments  for lending, because both the World Bank and
ILMF  have a different department for each continent, and these different departments may
have different propensities to make loans. I also include initial income as an instrument
of adjustment  loan frequency.
With the same set of instruments, I also tested the direct effect of adjustment
lending on growth, not controlling for any other factors. In line with a long and
inconclusive  literature, I found no systematic effect of adjustment lending on growth. (A
recent paper by Przeworski and Vreeland 2000 reviews the long inconclusive literature
on the IMF, while they themselves find a negative effect controlling for selection bias.
Some internal Bank and Fund studies have found positive effects of their programs on
growth. I do not intend to make the effect of structural adjustment on growth a major
focus of the paper, since structural adjustment would of course alleviate poverty if it
raised growth and worsen it if it lowered growth.) Of course, behind this zero average
result is concealed a set of expansions and contractions that depended in part on the
particulars  of the adjustment  program in each country and time period. In general, we
would expect that an adjustment  program would disfavor some sectors that were
previously  artificially protected or subsidized, and favor other sectors that benefit from a
change in relative prices in their favor. Whether expansion or decline dominates depends
in part on the relative sizes of the expanding and declining sectors (as pointed out by
Rauch 1997).
The result on expansions strongly reducing the rate of poverty -- or output crises
raising the rate of poverty -- is familiar from other studies (Ravallion and Chen 1997,
Dollar and Kraay 2000, Bruno et al. 2000, Lustig 2000, Ravallion 2000). Without8
controlling  for other variables, the mean growth elasticity of poverty is about 1.9 (Table
2).
The significant  coefficient on the interaction term between the Gini coefficient
and the growth rate also confirms the Ravallion 1997 and Bruno et al. 2000 result (Table
2). Ten percentage points higher Gini will lower the growth elasticity of poverty by 0.6
percentage points. A not-often-noticed implication  of this result is that the poor will be
hurt less by output contraction in a highly unequal economy than in a relatively equal
one, simply because the poor have a low share of output to begin with. The initial Gini
also has a direct negative effect on the change in poverty, suggesting a reversion to
greater equality if a country begins highly unequal.
The new result in this paper is that, while adjustment  lending has no direct effect
on poverty reduction, it has a strong interaction effect with economic growth (Table 2).7
The absolute value of the growth elasticity of poverty declines by about 2 points for
every additional IMF or World Bank adjustment  loan per year. The results are strong
either in OLS or instrumenting for World Bank and IMF programs with the instruments
shown.
This means that the poor benefit less from expansions during a structural
adjustment  program than in expansions without an adjustment  program, while they are at
the same time hurt less by contractions. Expansion under adjustment lending is less pro-
poor, while contraction under adjustment lending is less anti-poor. The welfare of the
poor may have increased from the income smoothing effect of adjustment lending.
7 IMF (1999)  found that "In seven SAF/ESAF  countries for which data are available, poverty rates declined
by an average of 20 percent under IMF-supported  adjustment  programs, implying an average annual
reduction of 5.3 percent" This study did not control for mean growth.9
On the other hand, it is disappointing  that the poor do not share fully in growth in
those cases where there are recoveries that accompany  adjustment lending. Since the
Bank and the Fund ultimately wish to restore growth in the economies to which they
make adjustment loans, it is worrisome that positive growth has less of a poverty-
reducing impact with high Bank-Fund involvement.10
Table 2: Regression results on change in poverty, growth, and adjustment programs
Dependent  Variable: Log rate of change per annum in percent of population below $2/day
Method:  Ordinary Least Squares Ordinary Least  Two-stage Least
Squares  Squares
Regression  Regression 2  Regression 3
1
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficie  t-Statistic
nt
C  0.039  1.82  0.319  4.68  0.382  4.21
GROWTH  -1.892  -8.24  -5.481  -8.27  -5.465  -4.61
GINI 1  -0.006  -3.83  -0.006  -3.65
PROGRAM  -0.019  -0.62  -0.116  -1.30
GROWTH*GINI1  0.058  3.27  0.057  2.68
GROWTH*PROGRAM  1.790  7.37  2.034  3.44
Included  observations:  149  144  1  126
Instruments for PROGRAM: CENTAM EASIA EGYPT FRZ SSA LAC ECA
GROWTH*CENTAM  GROWTH*EASIA  GROWTH*FRZ  GROWTH*EGYPT
GROWTH*SSA  GROWTH*GINI1  GROWTH*LAC  GROWTH*ECA  LGDPPC
Variable definitions
GROWTH  Log rate of growth per annum in mean of household survey
GINII  Initial Gini coefficient  l
PROGRAM  Number of IMF/World Bank adjustment loans initiated per annum
CENTAM  Dummy for Central America
FRZ  Dummy  for Franc Zone  __=___
EGYPT  Dummy for Egypt and Israel  X
SSA  Dummy for Sub-saharan  Africa
LAC  Dummy for Latin America
ECA  Dummy for Eastern Europe  and Central  Asia
EASIA  Dummy for East Asia  I_I
LGDPPC  Log of initial per capita income (Summers-Heston)11
Figure 1 illustrates the results. Countries with a low level of adjustment lending
(AL) as measured by PROGRAM and low inequality have both greater increases in
poverty during contraction and greater falls in poverty during expansions than do
countries with a high level of IMF and World Bank lending and high inequality. (High
and low AL here just mean the upper and lower 50% of the sample as measured by
program; expansion is the average of all increases in mean income while contraction is
the average of all decreases in mean income).12
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Another way of illustrating the weakened link between growth and poverty
reduction with high inequality and high adjustment  lending is to calculate the number of
perverse outcomes in quartiles of the sample defined by high and low inequality and high
and low adjustment  lending. A perverse outcome is defined as either a mean expansion
with an increase in poverty, or a mean contraction with a decrease in poverty. Such
perverse outcomes are rare except in the case when both inequality and adjustment
lending are high, when they account for 27 percent of the sample (Figure 2).13
Figure  2: Probability  of perverse  poverty-growth  outcomes  depending  on level  of inequality
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What is the marginal  impact  on poverty  of IMF and World Bank adjustment
loans? If we specify  a counterfactual  of zero adjustment  lending to all countries  in the14
sample, we find that the effect of the actual adjustment  loans on the number of poor was a
net increase of 14 million. This represents  an increase of 0.4 percentage points in the
population-weighted  average poverty rate in the sample. The outcome reflects the net
effect of an increase in the number of poor compared to the counterfactual of no
adjustment loans in growing countries like India and China, while there was a decrease in
poverty compared to the counterfactual in contracting countries like Russia and Ukraine.
The unweighted median change in the poverty rate associated with adjustment loans is
0.0.
Table 3 uses the coefficients  from regression (2) to calculate the poverty elasticity
with respect to growth at different levels of the Gini coefficient and adjustment loans per
year (AL). The middle cell is close to using the average value for Gini and AL, and we
reproduce the familiar elasticity of 2. However, there is great fluctuation around this
average for different measures of the Gini and AL. If there are no adjustment  loans and
inequality is very low, then poverty is extremely elastic with respect to growth (3.8).
China in 1990-92  is an example of an observation  that would approximately fall in this
cell. At the other extreme a highly unequal country receiving adjustment loans sees no
effect of growth or contraction on poverty. Colombia in 1995-96  is an example of a
country that would roughly fit in this cell.
Table  3: Poverty  elasticities  with  respect  to growth  for
different  Gini coefficients  and adustment  loan  intensity
Average  number  of adjustment
loans per year  during  su vey spell
GINI  coefficient  0  0.5  1
30  -3.8  -2.7  -1.7
45  -2.9  -1.9  -0.9
60  -2.1  -1.0  0.015
I performed several robustness checks on these results. First, I looked for
asymmetries  between expansion and contraction  in both growth effects and the
interaction term with adjustment  lending. I found no evidence for any asymmetries -- the
interaction term between adjustment  lending and growth remains statistically significant
in the separate samples of expansions and contractions.
Second, I added the initial poverty rate both in levels and as an interaction term.
The initial poverty rate enters with a negative sign in levels -- indicating some tendency
of poverty to revert to the mean -- but it leaves the significance of the interaction term
between adjustment  lending and growth unchanged.
Third, I entered the mean household consumption from the household survey,
both in levels and as an interaction term with growth. It left the coefficient on the growth
and adjustment  program interaction unchanged in magnitude and significance, while the
mean household consumption was not significant either in levels or as an interaction term
with growth.
Given all the interest in currency crises, I examine the 4 currency crisis cases that
are in the present sample: Mexico (89-95), Indonesia (1996-99), Russia (1996-98), and
Thailand (1996-98).  All of them had at least one adjustment loan per year during the
period before and during the crisis (Table 4).  Growth was negative in all cases, but the
increases in poverty were fairly modest except for Indonesia. We should not make much
out of 4 datapoints in a sample of 126 observations, but it's still interesting to see if we
can explain the differential poverty response to currency-output  crises with the
regression. We can understand  Mexico's low poverty-growth  elasticity as reflecting its
high inequality and its receipt of adjustment loans. Thailand's  near zero poverty-growth16
elasticity could be rationalized as a consequence of its high adjustment intensity and its
relatively average rate of inequality. Indonesia fits the story with a slightly below average
elasticity associated with low inequality but relatively intense adjustment lending. Russia
is an outlier, with a high elasticity despite an extraordinarily  high number of adjustment
loans per year.
Table  4: Growth,  poverty,  and adjustment  lending  in currency  crises
Country  Spell  mean  rate of  poverty  Percent  of  Percent  of  Gini  Average
growth change  of wrt growth  population population  coefficient, number  of
poverty  elasticity  below  below  beginning adjustment
$2/day,  $2/day,  end  loans  per
beginning  year
Indonesia  96-99  -4.3%  7.5%  -1.73  50.51  63.21  36.45  1.0
Mexico  89-95  -1.9%  1.5%  -0.81  38.80  42.47  55.14  1.0
Russia  96-98  -0.6%  1.3%  -2.16  24.43  25.08  48.03  2.5
Thailand  96-98  -1.8%  -0.2%  0.10  28.25  28.15  43.39  1.5
III. Testing the counter-cyclicality  of adjustment  lending
One possible explanation for the poverty-smoothing  effect of adjustment lending
may be that conditionality on macro adjustment  is tougher during expansions than
contractions,  since the Fund and Bank may fear deepening a contraction with excessive
austerity. If the poor disproportionately  suffer from austerity, then in contractions they
will suffer less for a given rate of mean income decline while conversely they will do less
well for a given rate of growth in expansions. Second, the principal means of fiscal
adjustment  under adjustment  programs during expansions may be through regressive
taxation like sales taxes, which lower the benefits to the poor of mean income growth.
Third, Bank and Fund lending programs may explicitly include "social safety nets" that
cushion the effect of a contraction on the poor, while these transfers may be reduced17
during expansions. I will first test for counter-cyclicality  of these variables, and then test
their effect on the poverty rate.
Table 5 test the counter-cyclicality  of adjustment  lending by presenting means of
macro and fiscal policy variables for quartiles of the sample divided between expansions
and contractions  and between high and low adjustment  lending. We find some evidence
for counter-cyclicality  of adjustment  lending. Inflation is above average during
contractions under high adjustment lending, suggesting conditions on monetary growth
and domestic credit expansion may be less tough if the economy is otherwise
experiencing a contraction. (There could also be reverse causation from above average
inflation to economic contraction,  but then why does this not show up under low
adjustment  lending?) Most interesting  of all, transfers are significantly above average
during contractions  under adjustment  lending,.while  they are significantly below average
during high-AL expansions; there is no such counter-cyclical behavior of transfers under
low adjustment  lending. Other macro and fiscal policy variables do not show significant
deviations from the means in the quartile subsamples.18
Table  5: Deviations  of policy  variables  from  long-run  averages  under  expansions  and
contractions  with  different  levels  of adjustment  lending  (t-statistics in italics)
variable  expansion  and  expansion  and  contraction  and contraction  and
high adjustment low adjustment high adjustment low adjustment
lending  lending  lending  lending
Macro policies (log deviations)
Black  market  premium  -6.7%  -7.3%  -6.2%  5.4%
-1.61  -2.45  -1.09  0.94
Inflation  -0.7%  0.4%  6.9%  6.3%
-0.72  0.21  2.63  0.61
Real  exchange  rate  -13.7%  -4.1%  -14.5%  -0.3%
(negative  is depreciation)
-4.90  -1.36  -3.68  -0.06
Real  interest  rate  0.0%  2.9%  2.5%  -3.1%
0.02  0.94  0.64  -0.46
Fiscal policies (% of GDP)
Budget  surplus  0.28  0.67  0.63  0.18
0.39  2.10  1.40  0.26
Transfers  -0.57  0.00  0.86  -0.18
-1.94  0.01  2.44  -0.45
Taxes  on domestic  goods  -0.12  0.32  -0.48  0.31
and services
-0.63_  1.84  -1.53  1.21
Table 6 does various tests of the equality of means across the quartiles displayed
in Table 5. Under high adjustment lending, I confirm that inflation and transfers are
significantly  higher under contractions  than under expansions, again reinforcing the
possibility  of countercylicality  of monetary and fiscal policy under adjustment lending.
There are something other interesting differences in means. The black market
premium moves counter-cyclically  under low adjustment  lending -- low during
expansions and high during contractions. Causation here could run in both directions, but
what is important for the poor is the pattern of cyclical covariation. Adjustment lending
eliminates this countercylicality,  which would tend to smooth consumption of the poor if
they suffer disproportionately  from high black market premiums.19
The other strong pattern that emerges is that adjustment  lending is associated with
a more depreciated real exchange rate, regardless of whether mean consumption is
expanding or contracting. This is no doubt because devaluation is often a condition of
IMF programs. There may also be reverse causation from currency collapses to the
initiation of World Bank and IMF adjustment loans. Devaluation itself may be
expansionary or contractionary (Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay 2000), perhaps depending on
the size of the initial current account imbalance and the currency denomination of public
and private debt relative to the tradeables intensity of those who owe the debts.20
Table  6: Testing  for countercyclical  effects  of IMF/World  Bank adjustment  lending  (AL)
(t-statistics in italics  high AL different  high AL different  expansions different  expansions  different
below coefficient)  than low AL during than low  AL during  than contractions  than contractions
expansions  contractions  during high AL  during low AL
variable  Coefficient  Obser- Coefficient  Obser-  Coefficient  Obser-  Coefficient  Obser-
on high  vations on high AL vations  on  vations  on  vations
AL  dummy  expansion  expansion
dummy  dummy  dummy
Macro policies  (log differences)
Black  market  0.01  58  -0.12  49  0.00  60  -0.13  47
premium
0.11  -1.36  -0.06  -2.13
Inflation  -0.01  67  0.01  54  -0.08  62  -0.06  59
-0.49  0.06  -2.79  -0.67
Real  exchange  rate  -0.10  57  -0.14  47  0.01  56  -0.04  48
(negative  means
depreciation)
-2.31  -2.31  0.17  -0.70
Real  interest  rate  -0.03  69  0.06  59  -0.02  64  0.06  64
-0.75  0.75  -0.56  0.89  X
Fiscal  policies  (percent  of GDP)  _
Budget  surplus  -0.40  43  0.44  43  -0.35  41  0.49  45
-0.55  0.53  -0.43  . 0.64
transfers  -0.57  42  1.05  42  -1.43  39  0.19  45
-1.46  1.94  -3.05  0.39
Taxes  on domestic  -0.44  43  -0.79  42  0.36  40  0.01  45
goods  or services
-1.69  -1.95  0.95  0.04
So there is some evidence that adjustment lending has counter-cyclical effects in ways
that may smooth the consumption of the poor. But is  there direct evidence that these
effects account for the lower growth elasticity of poverty under adjustment  lending?
Unfortunately,  it is difficult to find evidence that these policy variables are responsible
for smoothing  poverty under adjustment  lending. The three examples of variables for
which adjustment  lending altered the cycle -- inflation,  the black market premium, and
fiscal transfers -- do not show any direct effect on poverty, either directly or interacted21
with growth (Table 7). Entering these variables leaves the interaction effect of growth
and adjustment  lending on poverty unchanged.
Easterly and Fischer 2000 find some evidence that inflation increases poverty,
when inflation is measured in absolute terms rather than relative to country averages.
They also find that the poor are more likely than the rich to mention inflation as a top
national problem in opinion surveys. Because of the difference  in methodology, I don't
think the results of Table 7 contradict the Easterly-Fischer  results on the effects of
inflation on poverty. I interpret the inflation deviation as a measure of the cyclical
component of inflation which may be altered by IMF and World Bank adjustment
lending. This cyclical component of inflation doesn't seem to have an effect on the log
change in the poverty rate, in contrast to the negative effect of very high absolute
inflation on the poor.22
Table 7: Regression of poverty rate on possible mechanisms  for poverty smoothing through
adjustment lending
Dependent  Variable: Log change in poverty rate
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  I
Regression  Regression 2  Regression 3
1  _
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic
C  0.010  1.00  0.006  0.64  0.020  1.46
GROWTH  -5.086  -6.36  -4.252  -5.72  -7.654  -5.57
GINI1*GROWTH  0.076  4.35  0.055  3.20  0.127  4.21
GROWTH*PROGRAM  0.713  2.13  0.752  2.13  1.180  2.57
GROWTH*PIDEV  -0.930  -1.17
PIDEV  -0.028  -0.62
GROWTH*BMPDEV  -1.200  -1.50
BMPDEV  -0.049  -1.07
GROWTH*TRANSFERS  -0.088  -0.57
TRANSFERS  -0.004  -0.35
Observations  99  91  65
Instrument  list: C  GROWTH  GINI1 CENTAM  EASIA  EGYPT  SSA
GROWTH*CENTAM  GROWTH*EASIA  GROWTH*EGYPT
GROWTH*SSA  GROWTH*LAC  GROWTH*FRZ  GROWTH*ECA
LGDPPC  LAC ECA FRZ LPOP  GROWTH*LPOP  GROWTH*Ancillary  Variable
Ancillary  Variable
New variables:  _
PIDEV  Deviation of log inflation from average 1980-
98
BMPDEV  Deviation of log black market  premium from average 1980-98
TRANSFERS  Deviation of transfers/GDP  from average 1980-98
The message of Table 7 is consistent  with the alternative  hypothesis  mentioned  at
the beginning  of the paper. The kind of macroeconomic  and fiscal policy  measures  that
the Bank and Fund  usually support may themselves  cause an expansion  or contraction  in
the aggregate  economy, depending  on the composition  of adjustment  packages.  But these
policies may not affect the poor very much because  the poor derive much of their income
from the informal  sector or subsistence  production. The beneficiaries  of government
transfers  also may simply be the middle class rather  than the poor.  I don't test this23
hypothesis directly, but I adduce a few illustrative bits of information. Table 8 shows the
share of the infornal sector in urban employment  in a variety of developing countries.
While there are many problems with the comparability  and accuracy of such statistics, the
message of Table 8 seems to consistently be that the urban informal sector is large. It
seems likely that the rural informal sector would be even larger.
Table 8: Estimates of size of urban informal sector as
percent of urban employment in developing countries
Country  Year  Percent
Argentina  1995  46
Benin  1992  48
Bolivia  1995  58
Botswana  1996  19
Brazil  1995  48
Cameroon  1993  57
Chile  1995  45
Colombia  1995  52
Costa  Rica  1995  40
Cote  d'Ivoire  1996  53
Croatia  1997  6
Ecuador  1995  48
Ethiopia  1996  33
Fiji  1990  43
Gambia  1993  83
Ghana  1997  79
Guatemala  1989  54
Honduras  1995  49
Jamaica  1996  24
Kenya  1995  58
Kyrgyzstan  1994  12
Latvia  1996  9
Madagascar  1995  58
Mali  1996  71
Mauritius  1992  24
Mexico  1995  54
Morocco  1988  28
Myanmiar  1996  54
Pakistan  1992  67
Panama  1995  3424
Table 8: Estimates of size of urban informal sector as
percent of urban employment  in developing  countries
(continued)
Paraguay  1995  55
Peru  1995  49
Philippines  1988  26
Poland  1995  13
Slovakia  1996  19
South  Africa  1995  17
Tanzania  1990  62
Thailand  1994  77
Tunisia  1981  39
Turkey  1993  15
Uganda  1993  84
Ukraine  1997  5
Uruguay  1995  32
Venezuela  1997  42
Zambia  1993  81
median  48
Source: ILO Key Indicators of the Labor Market
The last piece in the puzzle is showing  that the poor derive much of their income
from informal and subsistence  income. I offer a suggestive example from Zambia and
Burkina Faso in Table 9.  Self-employment  income is extremely important for the poorest
deciles in Zambia. The bias is less extreme in Burkina Faso, but the poorest still have
their earnings skewed towards self-employment  income. These surveys are suggestive  of
the importance of the informal sector for the poorest households, lending credence to the
relative insulation of the poor from structural adjustment  measures.
Lipton and Ravallion 1995 (p. 2601) stress that there is considerable
heterogeneity within the urban informal sector, with an individual's poverty depending
more on individual attributes like human capital than on any economy-wide labor market
distortion leading to the creation of an informal sector. Other distortions may exclude the
poor from taking advantage of reforms under structural adjustment,  like lack of access to25
credit. Van de Walle 2000 shows evidence of lower return to formal sector investments
(irrigation  in her specific example) for the less educated.  The poor may be geographically
isolated from the formal sector economy, which may be exacerbated by poor
infrastructure.  Whatever the distortion or initial endowment  at work, the individuals who
are poor may be ill-placed to take advantage of new opportunities created by structural
adjustment programs,  just as they may suffer less from the destruction of old
opportunities enjoyed by protected sectors prior to structural adjustment.
Table 9: Sources  of income  - percent  share  by  income  decile,  from  poorest
to richest
Zambia  Household  Survey  Burkina  Faso  HH Survey




1  100%  0%  42%  58%
2  99%  1%  32%  68%
3  94%  6%  21%  79%
4  67%  33%  19%  81%
5  45%  55%  17%  83%
6  17%  83%  15%  85%
7  12%  88%  18%  82%
8  11%  89%  21%  79%
9  10%  90%  27%  74%
10  36%  64%  46%  54%
Source:  Devarajan  et al. 2000,  Fofack  200026
IV. Conclusions
The results in this paper are suggestive that IMF and World Bank adjustment
lending provides a smoothing of consumption for the poor, lowering the rise in poverty
for a given contraction, but also lowering the fall in poverty for a given expansion.
Adjustment lending seems to play a similar role to inequality, in lowering the sensitivity
of poverty to the aggregate growth rate of the economy.
The lower sensitivity of poverty to growth under adjustment lending is bad news
during expansions and good news during contractions. If we think of the normal steady
state of the economy as being one of positive growth, then adjustment lending is bad
news for the growing economy; it means the poor share less in the expansion of the
economy. One might think that adjustment lending happens only during non-steady-state
output crises, but adjustment lending has been so continuous for some economies, it is
hard to speak of it as purely a transitional phenomenon.
From a political economy point of view, lowering  the sensitivity of poverty to the
aggregate  growth rate could be dangerous because it gives the poor less of a stake in
overall good economic performance. This might increase the support of the poor for
populist experiments at redistributing  income.
These results could be interpreted to give support to either the critics or the
supporters of structural adjustment programs. To support the critics, growth under
structural programs is less pro-poor than in economies not under structural adjustment
programs. To back the supporters,  contractions under structural adjustment hurt the poor
less than contractions not under structural adjustment  programs.27
The question not fully resolved by this paper is: why does structural adjustment
reduce the sensitivity of poverty to growth? Although there is evidence that adjustment
lending alters the cycle for some policy variables, there is no evidence that these
alterations affect poverty. I speculate that the poor may be ill-placed to take advantage of
new opportunities created by structural adjustment  reforms, just as they may suffer less
from the loss of old opportunities in sectors that were artificially protected prior to
reforms.28
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